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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KARNA HELD, 
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vs. 
AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 8513 
Appeal from the Third J udicia1 District Court, 
In and for Salt Lake :County, State of Utah 
Honorable Martin M. Larson, District Judge 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
IN'TRODUC.TION 
This cause is before this Honorable Court pur-
suant to its Order (R. 23) dated April 25, 1956, 
granting appellant's (defendant below) Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal (R. 25-36) from the Order 
of the District Court (R. 21) denying appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss (R. 18). (The citation "R." fol-
lowed by a number refers to pages of the Record 
on Appeal). 
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STATEMENT OF FAC·TS 
Respondent (plaintiff below), a former em-
ployee of the appellant, brought this action in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, alleging that appellant had discharged 
her in breach of contract, an'd seeking damages in 
the amount of $31,900.00 for that breach (R. 1-3). 
Specifically respondent alleged: 
'fhat on the 2nd day of December, 1954, 
defendant discharged plaintiff and terminated 
her employment relationship. That said dis-
charge was without good and sufficient cause 
and was in violation of the terms and con-
ditions of the collective bargaining agreement 
between defendant and the Amalgamated 
(sic) Clothing Workers of America, local 
union No. 562. (Paragraph IV of Complaint, 
R. 2, emphasis added). 
Respondent had been employed by appellant for 
several years as a press operator. She was a member 
of the Amalgamated 'Clothing Workers of America, 
Local Union No. 562, ( R. 1, 4), which union had 
entered into a written collective bargaining agree-
ment with appellant covering certain terms and 
conditions of employment for certain job classifica-
tions at appellant's Salt Lake City plant, including 
the job classification in which respondent was em-
ployed ( R. 44-48) . A copy of that collective bargain-
ing agreement is printed beginning at page 20 of 
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the Appendix to this brief for the convenience of 
the Court. 
It is undisputed that at the time of her dis-
charge by appellant on or about December 2, 1954 
said collective bargaining agreement was in full 
force and effect, and that respondent's job-classific-
ation was covered thereby (R. 11). 
Respondent protested her discharge, and the 
union, on her behalf and with her knowledge, con-
sent, and participation, submitted the grievance to 
arbitration before William H. Leary, agreed upon 
by the union and appellant as sole arbitrator, upon 
the following issue, to-wit: 
Was the discharge of Karna Held on 
Decem'ber 2nd, 1954, by the Company in viola-
tion of Article III of the contract between the 
parties? ( R. 50) . 
Article III of the contract reads as follows: 
ARTICLE III 
DISCRIMINATION 
The Company agrees not to suspend, dis-
cipline, discharge or discriminate against any 
employee for lawful union activities. (R. 44, 
Appendix p. 21). 
The arbitrator, after hearing testimony ad-
duced by both the appellant and the union, made his 
written decision on April 4, 1955 in which he an-
swered the issue submitted in favor of appellant, 
. 
saying: 
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2. The discharge of Karma (sic) Held 
on December 2, 1954, by the Company was not 
in violation of Article III of the Contract be-
tween the parties. (R. 55, emphasis added). 
Consequently it is clear that respondent cannot 
rely here on an alleged violation of Article III of 
the contract. In fact it has been stipulated that the 
question of a violation of Article III is not an issue 
in this case. ( R. 43 ) . 
Appellant answered respondent's complaint, al-
leging that it failed to state a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted, and denying that respondent's 
discharge was without just cause, or that it was 
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement 
(R. 4, 5). 
The case came on for Pre-Trial Hearing before 
the Honorable Martin M. Larson, District Judge, 
on January 28, 1956 (R. 19) (the Pre-Trial Order 
reciting February 28, 1956 is in error) at which 
time appellant filed its written Motion to Dismiss 
( R. 18). The Trial Court took the matter under 
advisement and after considering the written mem-
oranda and agruments of both parties the Trial 
Court made and entered its written Order dated 
March 6, 1956 (R. 21), wherein it denied appel-
lant's Motion to Dismiss, holding that: 
1. The M'aster Labor Agreement be-
tween the defendant and the union, even in the 
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absence of an express provision so providing, 
gives to each employee covered thereby a right 
to continuing employment which cannot be 
terminated by the defendant as employer ex-
cept for just cause. 
2. Any employee working under such 
a labor agreement has the right to a jury trial 
on the issue of whether or not his discharge 
was for just cause. Consequently plaintiff 
has a right to maintain this action. (R. 21, 
22, emphasis added). 
A copy of that Order is printed beginning at 
page 29 of the Appendix to this brief for the con-
venience of the Court. 
Pursuant to Rule 72 ('b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, appellant thereupon duly filed in this 
Honorable Court its Petition for Interlocutory Ap-
peal from said Order ( R. 25-29). Said petition was 
granted by this Honorable Court on April 25, 1956 
(R. 23). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND 
ENTERING ITS ORDER DATED MARCH 6, 1956 IN 
'WHICH IT: (a) HELD THAT THE MASTER LABOR 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND 
THE UNION, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EX-
~PRESS PROVISION SO PROVIDING, GIVES TO EACH 
EMPLOYEE COVERED THEREBY A RIGH'T TO CON-
TINUING EMPLOYMENT WHICH CANNOT BE TER-
MINATED BY THE APPELLANT AS EMPLOYER EX-
CEPT FOR JUST CAUSE; (b) HELD THAT ANY EM-
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PLOYEE WORKING UNDER SUCH A LABOR AGREE-
MENT HAS THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT HIS DISCHARGE WAS 
FOR JUST CAUSE; (c) DENIED APPELLANT'S MO-
TION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent has alleged that her discharge by 
appellant was "without good and sufficient cause" 
and was "in vio'lation of the terms and conditions 
of the collective bargaining agreement" (R. 2). 
Appellant strongly contends that it did have just 
cause for discharging respondent. However, for pur-
poses of this appeal, it is immaterial whether or not 
such just cause actually and in fact did exist, as 
will be developed in the following argument. 
1. Basic Concepts of the Employer-Employee Relation-
ship. 
In a free country employment is a relationship 
which depends upon mutual consent of the employer 
and the employee. It may be described as a contrac-
tual relationship, terminable at will under the com-
mon law. No free man can be compelled to work for 
another against his will, and an employer has the 
unquestioned right to discharge or lay off employees 
at will, except insofar as this right has been re-
stricted by statute or bargained away by contract. 
As the Maryland Court of Appeals has so aptly put 
it: 
"* * * when not bound by contract every 
free man has a natural right to wo~k for 
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whom he pleases, and to cease to work when 
he chooses, without liability on his part to the 
employer. To enforce the opposite view would 
lead to the establishment of involuntary servi-
tude. Every employer must recognize this 
right on the part of the employees, and, if 
by such action loss results, it is damnum abs-
que injuria. The employer has the same un-
doubted right, when not prevented by contract, 
to discharge the employees, which may, and in 
many cases does, result in loss and injury to 
the employee and those depen'dent upon him; 
yet this loss and injury, too, must be suffered 
by the employee without being able to main-
tain an action therefor against the employer." 
Bricklayers, M. & P. Int. Union v. Ruff & 
Sons, Inc. (Md. 1931) 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 
52, 83 ALR 448, 456, (emphasis added). 
The text writers have stated the rule as follows: 
"In the absence of something in the con-
tract of employment to fix a definite term of 
service, or other contractual provision to re-
strict the right of the employer to discharge, 
or some statutory restriction upon this right, 
an employer may lawfully discharge an em-
ployee at what time he pleases and for what 
cause he chooses without thereby becoming 
liable to an action against him." (35 Am. Jur. 
469, Master and Servant, Section 34, citing 
numerous cases. Emphasis added). 
See also 56 C.J.S. 411, Master and Servant, 
Sec. 29 and cases cited therein. 
This right of an employer to discharge at will 
has been said to be "a constitutional right of the 
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utmost importance". N.L.R.B. v. Citizens News Co. 
(CA 9th 1943) 134 F.2'd 9'70. And another court 
has said an employee "may be discharged by the em-
ployer for a good reason, a poor reason, or no reason 
at all, so long as the terms of the statute are not 
violated." N.L.R.B. v. Condenser Corp. ( CA 3rd 
1942) 128 F. 2d 67, 10 LRRM 483. 
As has been stated above, an employer's other-
wise complete and absolute right to discharge with-
out liability for so doing can be limited by statute 
or by contractual provision. The typical limitation 
imposed by state and federal labor laws is that an 
employer may. not discharge because of lawful union 
activity on the part of an employee. It should be 
noted that this same limitation is also imposed upon 
the appellant here by the terms of Article III of the 
Master Labor Agreement (R. 44, Appendix p. 20). 
However, it is stipulated in this case that there is 
no question of a violation of Article III herein in-
volved. 
2. Collective Bargaining Agreements and Employ-
ment Contracts Distinguished. 
There is a basic difference between a collective 
bargaining agreement and an employment contract. 
The former is typically an agreement in writing be-
tween an employer and a union which sets forth 
certain terms and conditions for the job classifica-
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tions covered thereby. Ordinarily the individual em-
ployees are not parties thereto, although they benefit 
directly therefrom, and in several jurisdictions they 
can directly enforce the provisions thereof, usually 
under t'he theory of third party beneficiary. A col-
lective bargaining agreement usually does not create 
or specify definite tenure of employment for the 
individual employees, but merely provides that in 
the event employees work in the job classifications 
covered by the agreement that the terms therein con-
tained shall be applied. Generally such agreements 
in effect establish minimums as to wages and other 
conditions below which an employer cannot go. 
On the other hand, an employment contract is 
ordinarily between an employer and the individual 
employee. While it may be written, it is most gener-
ally oral. It is the device by which the actual hiring 
is accomplished and the employer-employee relation-
ship is established. It is this individual employment 
contract, generally which creates the job tenure, if 
any in fact exists. Such individual employment con-
tracts or hirings are of course subject to and en-
titled to the benefits of the collective bargaining 
agreement if one exists. Mr. Justice Jackson, in 
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, has 
stated it in this manner: 
"Contract in labor law is a term the im-
plications of which must be determined from 
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the connection in which it appears. Collective 
bargaining between employer a!ld the repr~­
sentative of a unit usually a union, results In 
an accord as to te~ms which will govern hir-
ing and work and pay in that unit. The result 
is not however a contract of employment 
except' in rare ca~es; no one has a job by reason 
of it and no obligation to any indiviljual or-
dinarily comes into existence from tt alone. 
The negotiations between union and manage-
ment result in what often has been called 
a trade agreement, rather than a contract of 
employment. Without pushing the analogy too 
far, the agreement may be likened to the 
tariffs established by a carrier, to standard 
provisions prescribed by supervising authori-
ties for insurance policies, or to utility sched-
ules of rates and rules for service, which do 
not of themselves establish any relationships 
but which do govern the terms of the shipper 
or insurer or customer relationship whenever 
and with whomever it may be established. 
*· * * * 
"After the collective trade agreement is 
made, the individuals who shall benefit by it 
are identified by individual hirings. The em-
ployer, except as restricted by the collective 
agreement itself and except that he must en-
gage in no unfair labor practice or discrimina-
tion, is free to select those he will employ or 
discharge. But the terms of the employment 
already have been traded out. There is little 
l~f~ to indiyid~a.l agreement except the act of 
hiring. This hiring may be by writing or by 
word of mouth or may be implied from con-
duct. In the sense of contracts of hiring indi-
vidual contracts between the employe~ and 
10 
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employee are not forbidden, but indeed are 
necessitated by the collective bargaining pro-
cedure." J. I. Case Company v. N.L.R.B. (U.S. 
Sup. Ct. 1944) 321 U.S. 332; 64 S. Ct. 576; 88 
L. E'd. 762; 14 LRRM 501, 503, emphasis 
added. 
3. Contractual Limitations on Appellant's Right to 
Discharge. 
(a) Term of Employment 
The general rule is that a general or indefinite 
hiring is presumed to be a hiring at will (56 C.J.S., 
Master and Servant, Section 8 (b) ) , and in the ab-
sence of express stipulations as to duration a con-
tract of employment may be terminated at the will 
of either party without cause and without liability 
to the other for such termination. Culver v. Kurn 
(Missouri 1946) 193 SW 602, 166 A.L.R. 644. The 
rule goes even further, to the effect that even where 
the employment contract, without specifying a fixed 
duration, purports to be for life, or for permanent 
employment, where the employee furnishes no con-
sideration other than his services incidenta1 to the 
employment, such an employment contract amounts 
only to an indefinite general hiring, terminable at 
the will of either party, and that a discharge with-
out cause does not constitute a breach of such con-
tract as will justify recovery of damages. (Annota-
tion: 135 A.L.R. 646, citing many cases including 
Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co. (Utah 1909) 
11 
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35 U. 379, 100 Pac. 677). In the Price case this 
Honorable Court said: 
"* * * As hereinbefore observed, the con-
tract neither expressly nor impliedly, bound 
him 'to act as appellant's attorney _for any 
specified period of time. Therefore tt lac~ed 
the essential element of mutualtty of obltga-
tion and was terminable at will by either 
party." (ibid, 100 Pac. 677, 680, emphasis 
ad·ded). 
We submit that a cursory examination of the 
Master Labor Agreement between the appellant and 
the union will show that it does not constitute an 
agreement for a definite term of service. We submit 
that under the general rules, supra, the employment 
of the respondent was for an indefinite term and 
consequently could be terminated at the will of either 
appellant or respondent. She could have terminated 
her employment at any time without incurring any 
legal lia'bility for such termination. We submit that 
the corollary of respondent's right to terminate at 
any time is the right of appellant to terminate the 
employment at any time, for if this were not the 
case there would be no mutuality of obligation and 
consequently no legally enforceable agreement for 
continuing employment. Price v. Western Loan & 
Savings Co., supra; Swart v. Huston (Kansas 1941) 
117 P. 2d 579. 
Since the Master Labor Agreement contains no 
12 
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provision expressing or implying employment for a 
definite term the presumption is that respondent's 
employment was terminable at wil1 and she must 
fail in her case unless the contract otherwise re-
stricts appellant's right to discharge. 
(b) Other Provisions of the Master Labor Agreement 
Since the agreement does not provide for a defi-
nite term of employment, and since Article III of 
the agreement is not herein involved, the basic issue 
narrows itself to a search for some other provisions 
of the agreement upon which the Trial Court's Order 
may be justified. Such a search is fruitless, for of 
course there are no such provisions. It should be 
remem1bered that the burden is on respondent to 
show that the agreement gives her the right she seeks 
to enforce, that is, the right to continue employ-
ment for as long as she wants it. The agreement 
must affirmatively create respondent's right to con-
tinuing employment. Appellant's right to discharge 
exists unimpaired unless affirmatively taken away 
by the agreement. 
A contractual provision which limits or re-
stricts such a "constitutional right of utmost impor-
tance" (Citizens News Co. case, supra) must clearly 
show that such was the intent of the parties. There 
is no express provision which gives respondent the 
cause of action she seeks to enforce, and we submit 
13 
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that there are no provisions from which such a limi-
tation on appellant's right to discharge can be reas-
onably inferred or implied. 
At the Pre-Trial hearing, respondent urged 
and relied upon the seniority provisions of the agree-
ment. Those provisions do not support respondent's 
cause of action. Seniority rights arise solely by vir-
tue of contract. They are not inherent, natural, or 
constitutional rights. Colbert v. Railroad Trainmen 
(CA. 9th 1953) 206 F. 2d. 9, 32 LRRM 2459; Zdero 
v. Briggs Mfg. Co. (Mich. 1953) 61 NW 2d 615, 33 
LRRM 2405. In this regard the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recently said: 
"Collective bargaining agreements creat-
ing a seniority system do not create a perman-
ent status or give an indefinite tenure to em-
ployees. (Citing cases). Seniority among rail-
road employees is contractual and does not 
arise from mere employment. (Citing cases). 
Those who acquire seniority rights under a 
contract are bound by the possibility that the 
contract may be changed, and the rights there-
under revised or abrogated. (Citing cases). 
Employees have no vested right in the senior-
ity created by contract and the Railway La-
bor: Act doe_s not undertake to guarantee them 
a JOb for ltfe. The employer has the right to 
sele9t and dis_c~arge them, so long as the col-
lecttve bargatntng processes are not impair-
ed." (Citing cases). M cMullans v. Kansas, 
Okla., & Gulf Ry. (CA lOth 1956) 229 F.2d 
50, 37 LRRM 2363, 2364. 
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Where seniority rights do in fact exist as a re-
sult of contract they are not inconsistent with the 
employer's right to discharge. (56 C.J.S. 64, citing 
Fine v. Pratt (Texas) 150 S.W. 2d 308). Since they 
exist by virtue of contract only, seniority rights are 
only as broad as the express terms of the contract. 
The only language in the agreement here relating 
to seniority is as follows: 
ARTICLE VIII 
SENIORITY 
The Company agrees in layoffs and re-
hiring of employees to observe the principle of 
departmental seniority wherever reasonable 
in the light of efficiency. The Company, how-
ever, to be the judge of qualifications in such 
matters. In applying seniority, the Employer 
shall take into consideration length of serv-
ice, merit and ability of the employee. (R. 
46, Appendix p. 23) . 
Note that under the agreement seniority will 
apply only in lay-offs and rehirings, and even in 
those cases only when reasonable in the light of ef-
ficiency, the company to be the judge. The term 
"lay-off" means a temporary or prolonged separa-
tion as a result of lack of work. ( CCH Glossary of 
Labor Terms). No one contends that respondent was 
merely "laid off". 
Respondent argues that the above seniority 
clause gives her the complete right to uninterrupted 
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job tenure until she is guilty of conduct constituting 
"just cause" for discharge. This argument does vio-
lence to the Englis'h language and to common sense 
and reason. 
We submit that the provisions of the agreement 
individually an·d;or collectively do not constitute a 
contractual limitation upon appellant's complete and 
a'bsolute right to discharge. Above all, those provi-
sions do not give to respondent "a right to continu-
ing employment which cannot be terminated except 
for just cause" as the Trial Court held in its Order. 
The ruling of the Trial Court in effect adds an ex-
press restriction against discharge to every collec-
tive bargaining agreement by judicial fiat. It grants 
to each employee covered by such an agreement a 
substantial property right, permanent job tenure, 
all without the agreement or consent of the contract-
ing parties. The ruling overturns the historical and 
heretofore unquestioned rights of employers which 
have a'lways existed. It is extremely doubtful that 
such a rule would be constitutional if established 
by the legislature. For it to be established by the 
District Court is unthinkable. 
4. The Russell Case. 
At the Pre-Trial respondent's counsel cited the 
Utah case of Russell v. Ogden Union Ry and Depot 
Co., (Utah 1952) Utah , 247 P. 2d 257, as 
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being a Utah case supporting respondent's position. 
A cursory reading of it shows that contrary to the 
impression that counsel tried to create the Russell 
case does not support respondent's contention. 
In the Russell case, Russell sued his employer 
for an alleged arbitrary and wrongful discharge, 
and recovered substantial damages in the trial court. 
This Honorable Court reversed the judgment for 
plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial. The 
contract of employment relied on by Russell pro-
vided that: 
''* * * No yardman will be suspended or 
dismissed without first having a fair and im-
partial hearing and his guilt established. 
* * *" (Emphasis ad.ded). 
The case was reversed for certain errors in re-
fusing to allow the employer to present evidence at 
the trial, and for errors with regard to damages. 
Counsel for tile respondent would equate the 
purposes clause and the seniority clause of appel-
lant's agreement with the provision in the Russell 
case contract quoted above. To argue that this may 
be done is to ignore the plain meaning of the words 
used and to ignore all common sense and judgment. 
It would be difficult to conceive or draft a stronger 
or more complete limitation on an employer's right 
to discharge than is quoted in the Russell case. Under 
such a provision an employer must hold a hearing 
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and the guilt of the employee must be established 
before he can be discharged. The majority opinion 
in the Russell case says that where such a provision 
existed the employee established a prima facie case 
by proving such a contract, his performance there-
of up to the time of his discharge, and damages. 
Then the burden falls upon the employer to prove 
justification for the discharge. But this rule as en-
unciated by the court is expressly limited to cases 
where the contract has such a limitation on the right 
to discharge as was therein involved. -
There is no such clause in the instant case. The 
Russell case does not aid the respondent, nor justify 
the Trial Court's Order. 
CONCLUSION 
1. At common law respondent has no cause 
of action, since appellant may discharge with or 
without cause and incur absolutely no liability there-
for. Tlhis right to discharge remains complete and 
unabridged except insofar as it may be limited by 
statute or bargained away by contract. 
2. Since no question of statutory limitation is 
involved, respondent must rely on breach of contract, 
which she has alleged. But the Master Labor Agree-
ment herein neither grants to respondent job tenure 
for a definite or continuing period nor directly or 
indirectly limits or restricts appellant's right to dis-
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charge. Consequently respondent's employment is 
terminab'le at will and there can be no liability on ap-
pellant for discharging her. 
3. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law 
when it held that the Master Labor Agreement gave 
to respondent a right to continuing employment 
which could not be taken away except for just cause. 
Its Order constitutes highly improper judicial legis-
lation. 
The Order of the Trial Court should be reversed 
and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss 
the complaint with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
619 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PETER W. BILLING'S 
802 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Counsel for Respondent 
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APPENDIX 
MASTER 
AGREEMENT 
THIS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT, made and entered into this Ninth day of 
September, 1948, by and 'between the AMERICAN 
LINEN SUPPLY CO., Salt Lake City, Utah located 
at 35 East Sixth South, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Company", and the AMALGAMATED 
CLOTHING WORKERS LOCAL UNION #562, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Union"; WITNES-
SETH THAT: The parties hereto mutually agree 
as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
OBJECTS 
The objects of this agreement, and the aims and 
intentions which the parties are desirous of attain-
. 1ng are: 
(a) To effectuate a spirit of fair dealings 
'between employer and employee. 
(b) To bring about and esta'blish a high order 
of discipline and efficiency by the intelligent cooper-
ation of employer and employee. 
(c) To provide for adjustment of all matters 
subject to arbitration by proceedure hereinafter set 
forth. 
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(d) To increase the standards of workman-
ship and conduct so as to insure a fair and proper 
quantity, quality and cost of production. 
(e) To raise the standards of the linen supply 
industry in the City of Salt Lake and vicinity so 
that it may command the respect and increased 
patronage of the public. 
ARTICLE II 
NO SITRIKE 
It is agreed that strikes, lockouts and sympathy 
strikes and stoppage of work are prohibited, subject 
to arbitration under Article X hereof. 
AR·TICLE III 
DISCRIMINATION 
The Company agrees not to suspend, discipline, 
discharge or discriminate against any employee for 
lawful union activities. 
AR:TICLE IV 
UNIT 
The term "employees" as used in this agree-
ment shall include: All employees of the American 
Linen Supply Co. at 3'5 East Sixth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, employed in the sewing department, 
soil sorting department, washing department, iron::. 
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ing department, bundling department, shipping de-
partment, cafeteria! department, shop department, 
garage department, and janitors, excluding super-
visory employees with the power to hire or fire or 
to effectively recommend such hiring or firing, such 
as superintendent, floor walker, floor lady, chief en-
gineer, washroom foreman, soil counter foreman, 
floor lady in the sewing department, head engineer, 
watchman, all office employees, all truck drivers 
and driver salesmen. 
ARTICLE V 
RECOGNITION 
The Company hereby recognizes the Union as 
the collective bargaining agent as provided for by 
law with respect to the employees described in Ar-
ticle IV, the appropriate unit for the purposes of 
collective bargaining, with respect to wages and 
other working conditions. 
ARTICLE VI 
UNION SECURITY 
All present employees covered by this contract 
shall become members of the Union not later than 
thirty (30) days following its effective date and 
shall remain members as a condition precedent to 
continued employment. This section shall apply to 
newly hired employees thirty (30) days from the 
date of their employment with the Company. 
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The foregoing section sha'll become effective 
after certification by the National Labor Relations 
Board issued in accordance with Section 8 (a-3-e) 
of the National Labor Relations Act as amended. 
ARTICLE VII 
CHECK-OFF .. 
The Company agrees during the term of this 
agreement to accept written assignments from em-
ployees, executed and delivered in conformance with 
Section 49-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and the 
Labor Management Act of 1947 as amended. 
AR'TICLE VIII 
SENIORITY 
The Company agrees in lay-offs and rehiring of 
employees to observe the principle of departmental 
seniority wherever reasonable in the light of effici-
ency. The Company, however, to lbe the judge of 
qualifications in such matters. In applying seniority, 
the Employer shall take into consideration length 
of service, merit and ability of the emp'loyee. 
AR1TICLE IX 
TRANSFER TO LOWER JOB CLASSIFICATION 
If the Company temporarily transfers an em-
ployee to a lower job classification, because of emer-
gency, the employee will not suffer a reduction in 
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his wage rate until such time as the Employer shall 
notify the Union or the employee that the transfer 
is perm anent. 
ARTICLE X 
ARBITRATION 
All controversies as to the interpretation and 
application of this Master agreement that cannot 
be settled by the representative of the Employer and 
the Union, within the period of one week from the 
date that the grievance is cal'led to the attention of 
the other party in writing, shall submit the matter 
for decision to a Board of Arbitration to be consti-
tuted as hereinafter set forth: 
(a) The Employer and the Union shall each 
select an arbitrator within forty-eight 
( 48) hours, and the two thus chosen shall 
select a third impartial arbitrator. In the 
event that the two so chosen are unable to 
agree upon a third member within forty-
eight hours, then it is understood and 
agreed that the rna tter in controversy shall 
then be immediately submitted to the Am-
erican Arbitration Association for settle-
ment by appointment of an arbitrator and 
a hearing fn accordance with the procedure 
of said Association. 
('b) Any and all decisions made in accordance 
with the procedure hereof set forth shall be 
bin_ding upon. parties to this agreement. 
Failure to abide by such decisions shall be 
considered a breach of this agreement and 
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the Union or Employer shall be free to 
enforce such decision by such action as it 
seems appropriate, anything under Article 
II to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The parties hereto agree that the expenses and 
fee of the third member or the American Arbitra-
tion Association shall be borne equally. 
ARTICLE XI 
ACCESS TO PLANT TO INVESIGATE 
GRIEVANCES 
A representative of the Union shall have access 
to the plant for the purpose of investigating griev-
ances or disputes. However, he must first receive 
permission from the plant manager or his represen-
tative. 
ARTICLE XII 
SHOP STEWARD 
The Company agrees to recognize a shop stew-
ard for the upstairs division and one for the down-
stairs division. These two stewards, together with 
the President of the Union, shall constitute the 
grievance committee. 
ARTICLE XIII 
LEAVE OF ABSENCE 
Leave of absence may be granted, without pay, 
for personal reasons for a period not to exceed thirty 
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(30) days upon written application of the employee 
and the approval of the Company. Any leave of ab-
sence extending· over thirty ( 30) days shall be in 
writing and m'ay be extended for an indefinite 
length of time upon agreement between the Com-
pany and the employee, with the approval of the 
Union. 
Employees selected to a Union position by the 
Union to do work which takes him from his employ-
ment with the company, shall, upon written request 
of the Union, receive temporary leave of absence 
for the period of his service with the Union for the 
duration of this agreement, and upon his return shall 
be re-employed at work in line with his seniority 
status in the classification in which he was engaged 
last prior to his leave of absence. 
ARTICLE XIV 
UNIFORMS 
All uniforms and protective clothing now fur-
nished by the Co·mpany shall be continued and main-
tained for the life of this agreement. There shall be 
no change in medical or insurance plans. 
ARTICLE XV 
MA'TERNITY LEAVE 
It is agreed that any female employee request-
ing leave of absence in maternity cases shall be 
granted such leave without loss of seniority. 
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ARTICLE XVI 
TERMINA:TION 
This Master Agreement shall remain in force 
and effect from date hereof, to and including the 
8th day of September, 1957. On or before sixty (60) 
days prior to the expiration date of this Master 
Agreement, either party may give written notice of 
its desire to change, modify or terminate this Mas-
ter Agreement or any portion thereof. In the event 
that either party or both desire to modify or change 
the same, then and in that event the parties shall 
meet immediately after receiving such notification, 
for the purpose of discussing such changes or modi-
fications. In the event of the failure of the parties 
to agree as to any such proposed changes or modifi-
cations, either of the parties to this agreement may 
at any time during such negotiations express its 
desire to have the matters submitted to arbitration 
as provided for in Article X. In the event that such 
notice is given by either party, the matters then in 
dispute at the time of receiving such notice shall 
be submitted to arbitration as provided for herein. 
The parties agree that during such arbitration 
or negotiations, there shall be no lock-out, strikes, 
slow downs or work stoppages. 
It is further understood and agreed that in the 
event that it shall be determined by the National 
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Labor Relations Board or a Federal Court of com-
petent jurisdiction, that the period of time agreed 
to for the duration of this contract is an unreason-
able length of time, then and in that event it is un-
derstood and agreed that this contract shall continue 
in force and effect for what such agency or court 
determines to be a reasonable length of time. 
IN WTTNESS WHEREOF, the parties have 
affixed the signatures of their authorized represen-
taives this 14th day of Sept., 1948. 
AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO. 
(SAUT LAKE CITY, UTAH) 
BY /s/ F. G. Steiner, Pres. 
/s/ 0. A. Knapp, Sec'y 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING 
WORKERS LOCAL UNION 
#562 
BY /s/ Arthur J. Christensen, 
Pres. 
/s/ Henrietta June Davis, 
Sec. 
Is/ Frank Bonacci 
CIO Regional Director 
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In the 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
in and for Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
KARNA HELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY 
CO., a corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 
105216 
This matter came on regularly for pre-trial 
hearing on Saturday, January 28, 1956 before the 
Honorable Martin M. Larson, one of the Judges of 
the above entitle'd Court. Plaintiff was represented 
by her counsel, Dwight L. King, and defendant being 
represented by its counsel, Peter W. Billings, Louis 
H. Callister, and Nathan J. Fullmer. Defendant 
filed its written motion to dismiss alleging that the 
pleadings, together with plaintiff's answer to de-
fendant's interrogatories and defendant's requests 
for admissions, showed that plaintiff did not have 
a claim against defen·dant upon which relief can be 
granted. 
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The Court heard the arguments of counsel, re-
ceived written briefs of counsel for both sides, and 
reviewed a copy of the Master Labor Agreement be-
tween the defendant and a labor union, which copy 
was furnished by the parties, under which plaintiff's 
rights must be determined. For the purpose of rul-
ing on defendant's motion to dismiss the legal issue 
which must be determined by the Court is whether 
or not the Master Labor Agreement prohibits the 
defendant from discharging its employees without 
just cause. 
The Court, having considered the provisions of 
the contract as well as the arguments and briefs of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises now 
rules as follows : 
1. The Master Labor Agreement between the 
defendant and the union, even in the absence of an 
express provision so providing, gives to each em-
ployee covered thereby, a right to continuing employ-
ment which cannot be terminated by the defendant 
as employer except for just cause. 
2. Any employee working under such a labor 
agreement has the right to a jury trial on the issue 
of whether or not his discharge was for just cause. 
Consequently plaintiff has a right to maintain this 
action. 
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3. Defendant's motion to dismiss is, accord-
ingly, denied. 
4. This case is set for jury trial on Friday, 
April13, 1956. 
Dated this 6th day of March, 1956. 
/s/ MAR:TIN M. LARSON 
JUDGE 
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